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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
characteristic of the letter of credit."
The application of equitable principles to letter-of-credit controver-
sies where fraud is involved is a welcome event in Minnesota. Under the
law developed in Shaffer, a holder in due course of drafts drawn under
a letfer of credit will have an absolute right to demand honor of those
drafts. The issuer, furthermore, may honor a draft even after receiving
notice from the customer that there may be fraud, forgery, or other
defects in the documents presented by the beneficiary or an assignee of
the beneficiary as long as the documents appear on their face to be
proper. The burden of determining whether a demand document has
been fraudulently presented falls upon the court rather than the issuer.
Therefore, the issuer faces the possibility of wrongfully honoring a letter
of credit only if it fails to exercise reasonableness and care in examining
the documents presented to it. Finally, a substantial portion of the
desired element of certainty in letter-of-credit transactions is preserved
by restricting the availability of injunctive relief to those situations
where the beneficiary, or an assignee who is not a holder in due course,
has presented fraudulent documents to the issuer in demanding pay-
ment under a letter of credit. Payment under the letter of credit will be
certain unless the beneficiary wrongfully attempts to evade fulfillment
of the conditions of the letter of credit itself. The decision of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Shaffer is a reasoned one, which effectively bal-
ances both the interests of the customer and the beneficiary while pro-
tecting the issuer who must honor the letter of credit it issues.
Indian Law-STATE JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN RESERVATIONs-Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, __ Minn. -, 248 N.W.2d 722
(1976).
Indian law in Minnesota is not a relic of the past as it is in some
states.' The tribal groups of Indian people which inhabit Minnesota's
Indian reservations, both as organized bodies and as individual persons,
interact on a daily basis with Minnesota's various governmental bodies
and non-Indian population. In the course of these interactions, disputes
arise which occasionally end in litigation, thus expanding the body of
0
44. See Harfield, supra note 2, at 258-59; Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of the Irrevoca-
ble Commercial Letter of Credit, 14 AM. J. Comp. L. 395, 421 (1965).
1. As used in the context of this comment, Indian law relates to the interaction between
a state and the Indian peoples within that state. The states of Alabama, Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and
West Virginia no longer have recognized federal or state Indian reservations. See U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND INDIAN TRUST AREAS
(1974) (listing all existing Indian reservations in the United States).
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Indian law in Minnesota. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. State2
is a part of this expansion.
The controversy in Red Lake arose when the Red Lake Tribal Council
promulgated an ordinance providing for the registration and licensing
of motor vehicles owned and operated by tribal members.' In conform-
ance with federal and tribal laws,4 the ordinance was submitted to,
and approved by, the Secretary of the Interior. After federal approval,
the tribal council submitted a request to the State of Minnesota,
through the commissioner of public safety, to enter into a reciprocal
motor vehicle registration and licensing agreement with the tribe.' The
state refused to enter into such an agreement and informed the tribal
council that any member of the tribe who operated a motor vehicle off
the reservation without a proper Minnesota vehicle registration or li-
cense would be subject to arrest.' Injunctive and declaratory relief from
the state's decision was sought, and, after trial court proceedings, judg-
ment was entered for the band. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's decision,' basing its decision on the special status of the
reservation8 and the effect of interactions between the state and the
reservation.'
An examination of both state and federal jurisdictional powers over
Indian reservations and tribal members is necessary to an understand-
ing of the court's decision in Red Lake. Exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters involving Indian reservations is retained by the federal govern-
2. - Minn. __, 248 N.W.2d 722 (1976).
3. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, Minn., Ordinance 1-74 (Jan. 16, 1974),
reprinted in Appellants' Brief and Appendix, at A-25 to -46, Red Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians v. State, __ Minn. __, 248 N.W.2d 722 (1976).
4. See 25 U.S.C. §§ la, 476 (1976); RED LAKE BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, MINN., CONST.
art. IX, reprinted in Appellants' Brief and Appendix, at A-21, Red Lake Band of Chip-
pewa Indians v. State, - Minn. _ 248 N.W.2d 722 (1976).
5. Minnesota statutes provide that the commissioner of public safety may enter into
reciprocity agreements with other jurisdictions for reciprocal recognition of vehicle regis-
trations, thereby promoting and encouraging the fullest possible use of Minnesota's high-
way system. See MINN. STAT. §§ 168.181, .187 (1976). Conditions and limitations on any
such reciprocity agreements are provided in MINN. STAT. § 168.181 (1976).
6. MINN. STAT. § 168.36(1) (1976) makes it a misdemeanor to use an unregistered or
unlicensed vehicle in Minnesota unless the vehicle is exempted from such registration and
licensing under MINN. STAT. ch. 168 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
7. The trial court's decision centered on whether an Indian reservation was intended
to be included within the definition of "state, territory, or possession," as used in MINN.
STAT. §§ 168.181(1), .187(3) (1976). Relying on State v. Storaasli, 180 Minn. 241, 230 N.W.
572 (1930), aff'd, 283 U.S. 57 (1931), the trial court in Red Lake felt that a reservation
did come within the definition and therefore the Red Lake Reservation was entitled to a
reciprocity agreement. See Appellants' Brief and Appendix, at A-53, A-55, Red Lake Band
of Chippewa Indians v. State, - Minn. __, 248 N.W.2d 722 (1976) (memorandum of
the court). The Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed this argument by assuming that the
legislature never considered this possibility. See - Minn. at __, 248 N.W.2d at 727.
8. See - Minn. at __, 248 N.W.2d at 725-26.
9. See id. at -, 248 N.W.2d at 727-28.
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ment until Congress specifically grants such jurisdiction to the states.'
In 1953 Congress enacted Public Law 280," thereby granting to Minne-
sota, among other states, jurisdiction over many civil and criminal ac-
tions on most reservations within the state." Jurisdiction over certain
items on all Minnesota reservations, however, was reserved by the fed-
eral government to the tribal groups. The items which were reserved
from the jurisdiction granted to Minnesota are items that generally were
the subject of treaties" and that are tied to the particular location in
which they occur, such as hunting," fishing, 1 trapping, 7 taxation, s and
other civil regulatory functions." Administration of tribal rights relating
to such matters is accomplished through statutes and ordinances passed
by the tribal government of each reservation. 2
Generally, statutes and ordinances passed by a tribal government
only control conduct on the reservation, whereas conduct off the reserva-
10. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 388-89 (1976) (per curiam); Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 594-95 (1832); State
v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 16 N.W.2d 752 (1944).
11. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1976), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970)).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1976) (granting criminal jurisdiction over Indian reserva-
tions to Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin); 28 U.S.C. §
1360(a) (1970) (granting civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations to Alaska, California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970). These sections deny
states the power to: alienate, encumber, or tax real or personal property of Indians or
tribes held in trust by the federal government; interfere with Indian property in manners
inconsistent with federal treaties, agreements, or statutes; or deprive Indians of their
rights under federal treaties, agreements, or statutes with regard to hunting, fishing, or
trapping.
14. See, e.g., C. KAPP.ER, INDIN. TREATIES 1778-1883, at 567-70, 839-42, 853-55, 861-62
(1972) (reprinting treaties between the United States and various Minnesota Chippewa
Indian tribes).
15. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Klamath &
Modoc Tribes & Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians v. Maison, 139 F. Supp. 634 (D. Or.
1956); State v. Cooney, 77 Minn. 518, 80 N.W. 696 (1899).
16. See Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 58-59 (1962); State v.
Forge, - Minn. __,__ -, 262 N.W.2d 341, 346-47 (1977).
17. See Klamath & Modoc Tribes & Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians v. Maison, 139
F. Supp. 634 (D. Or. 1956); State v. Cloud, 179 Minn. 180, 228 N.W. 611 (1930); Cohen
v. Gould, 177 Minn. 398, 404-06, 225 N.W. 435, 437-38 (1929).
18. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174
N.W.2d 120 (1970).
19. See Indian Political Action Comm. v. Tribal Executive Comm., 416 F. Supp. 655
(D. Minn. 1976) (running of elections); Namekagon Dev. Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation
Housing Auth., 395 F. Supp. 23 (D. Minn) (establishment of a housing authority), aff'd,
517 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1974). See generally United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir.
1974) (areas traditionally left to tribal self-government retained by the tribes).
20. See, e.g., RED LAKE BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, MINN., CONST. art. VI, §§ 3-5,
reprinted in Appellants' Brief and Appendix, at A-18 to -19, Red Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians v. State, - Minn. -, 248 N.W.2d 722 (1976).
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tion is controlled by state law.' The Minnesota court has recognized,
therefore, that in some cases there will be one standard of conduct set
by the tribal government for the reservation and a different standard for
the same conduct in the rest of the state."2 Where two different stan-
dards covering the same conduct exist, conflicts can arise.2 In most
cases where a conflict arises as a result of these differing standards, the
Minnesota court has been able to resolve the conflict by applying one
of two principles. The first principle provides that the State of Minne-
sota has no authority to govern the affairs of persons within the terri-
torial boundaries of a reservation unless specifically authorized to do so
by Congress.2 4 The second principle recognizes that Minnesota has au-
thority over persons normally under the jurisdiction of the reservation
when they are off the reservation but within the state."
These two principles generally are sufficient to resolve conflicts be-
tween different standards of conduct when the conduct is tied to a
particular location. For example, when fishing, a person is either on the
reservation and thus subject to the reservation's regulation under the
first principle, or off the reservation, in which case the second principle
would apply and the state's regulations would control. The fact that the
state has a regulation concerning fishing which is different from the
reservation's has no bearing on the reservation's ability to enforce its
own regulation and vice versa.
2
Jurisdictional considerations that apply to other Minnesota reserva-
tions do not always apply to the Red Lake Reservation, however. At the
time Congress was considering Public Law 280, the Red Lake Band
voiced strenuous objection to being included in the bill27 and the result-
ing termination of federal jurisdiction .2 Because the band had an organ-
ized court system2' and because of its objection to termination, Congress
was prompted to retain federal jurisdiction over the civil and criminal
21. See notes 24-26 infra and accompanying text.
22. See Rogers v. Cordingley, 212 Minn. 546, 4 N.W.2d 627 (1942) (divorce which would
be invalid under state law will be given effect if it conforms with reservation law).
23. See, e.g., State v. Forge, - Minn. -, , 262 N.W.2d 341, 348 (1977) (differ-
ing license fees for fishing between state and reservation).
24. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, __ Minn. ____ , 248
N.W.2d 722, 726 (1976); notes 10-19 supra and accompanying text.
25. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, - Minn. at __, 248 N.W.2d at
726. Accord, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); In re Wolf, 27
F. 606, 610 (W.D. Ark. 1886); Pablo v. People, 23 Colo. 134, 136-37, 46 P. 636, 637 (1896);
Voorhees v. Spencer, 89 Nev. 1, 5-6, 504 P.2d 1321, 1323-24 (1973).
26. See generally State v. Forge, - Minn. __, 262 N.W.2d 341 (1977).
27. See Note, Minnesota's Chippewas: Treaties and Trends, 39 MINN. L. REy. 853, 867
(1955).
28. "Termination" is the term used to describe the federal Indian policy of the early
1950's under which federal supervision and wardship of Indians was relinquished to the
states and Indian people were to be absorbed into the dominant culture. See generally D.
McNICKLE, NATIVE AMEMcAN TRRiAUsM 103-12 (1973).
29. See Note, supra note 27, at 866 n.73.
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matters of the reservation when it passed Public Law 280.11 Consistent
with this retention of jurisdiction by the federal government, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court has not allowed the state to assert jurisdiction over
the Red Lake Reservation."1
All other Indian reservations in Minnesota only have authority to
control conduct relating to the limited matters reserved to them by the
federal government under Public Law 280.32 While the Red Lake Band
has this authority as well, its authority does not end with these matters
but extends to all civil and criminal conduct on the reservation.33 Under
this broader authority, the Red Lake Tribal Council has jurisdiction
over conduct on the reservation and, in addition, control over some
conduct off the reservation.
The conflict in Red Lake was caused by an exercise of this broader
authority of the Red Lake Band. While motor vehicle registration and
licensing ordinances initially control conduct on the reservation, much
like a fishing regulation, the effect of such motor vehicle ordinances is
not intended to end at the boundaries of the reservation any more than
the vehicles affected are expected to stop at those boundaries. Noting
the size of the reservation and the total length of the roads in it,35 the
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970); S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2409.
31. Holding that the State of Minnesota had no jurisdiction over an automobile colli-
sion on the Red Lake Reservation, the court in Sigana v. Bailey, 282 Minn. 367, 369, 164
N.W.2d 886, 888 (1969) stated: "The law is clear that until the federal government by act
of Congress or otherwise transfers its exclusive jurisdiction over Indians residing within a
reservation to the state, the state has no jurisdiction over criminal or civil actions arising
between Indians residing in the reservation." Accord, Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun,
286 Minn. 43, 49, 53, 174 N.W.2d 120, 124, 126 (1970) (no state authority to impose taxes
on income earned on the reservation where person being taxed resides on the reservation);
State v. Lussier, 269 Minn. 176, 182, 130 N.W.2d 484, 488 (1964) (no state jurisdiction
over burglary by Indians on the Red Lake Reservation); In re Beaulieu, 264 Minn. 406,
416, 119 N.W.2d 25, 32 (1963) (residency on Red Lake Reservation not considered
"settlement" for purposes of Minnesota's poor-relief laws).
32. See notes 10-19 supra and accompanying text.
33. Compare text accompanying notes 10-12 supra with text accompanying notes 27-
30 supra. The court in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956)
held that Indian tribes retained all the inherent rights of sovereignty except where re-
stricted by the United States. After the passage of Public Law 280, other reservations in
Minnesota lost civil and criminal jurisdiction to the state. See Note, supra note 27, at 865.
The Red Lake Reservation was excepted, however, and did not lose this jurisdiction. See
In re Beaulieu, 264 Minn. 406, 413-14, 119 N.W.2d 25, 30 (1963).
34. See notes 39-43 infra and accompanying text. All Minnesota reservations may con-
trol hunting, fishing, trapping, and other items reserved by treaty, agreement, and stat-
ute; however, only the Red Lake Reservation has general civil and criminal jurisdiction.
Although criminal jurisdiction is tied to the location where the criminal act occurs, the
Red Lake Reservation's civil jurisdiction may extend beyond its borders. An example of
such jurisdiction would be a tax on all income of reservation residents, no matter where
the income was earned. Such a tax would be a valid use of the civil jurisdiction of the
reservation, yet it would have an effect on conduct outside the reservation.
35. "The territory now comprising the reservation consists of only 882 square miles.
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court in Red Lake concluded that to restrict the applicability of the
registration and licensing ordinance only to land within the reservation
would, because of the necessity for the residents of the Red Lake Reser-
vation to make regular use of state highways off the reservation, make
such an ordinance of little value except for "the symbolism involved"3
and would "undermine the effectiveness of the band's efforts to achieve
effective self-government. ' 3 If the court would have applied the two
principles under which the place of the act is determinative of jurisdic-
tion, the Red Lake Band's broad right of self-government would have
been rendered meaningless.38
Because application of the two principles was insufficient to protect
the Red Lake Band's right of self-government, the court articulated a
third principle for the first time. 9 This third principle requires that the
state follow a policy of comity with the Red Lake Reservation in the
same way the state observes comity with other states. A two-part test
is used to implement this third principle. As enumerated by the court,
the test requires: (1) that actions by the state which adversely affect the
Red Lake Band's right of self-government be subordinated to the band's
regulation in the same area,' 0 unless (2) the state has a compelling
reason for its action.'" Application of this principle extends to the Red
Lake Band's regulations and ordinances the same deference which Min-
nesota extends to a neighboring state's laws in cases where Minnesota's
interests are less than compelling.'" But, where a compelling state inter-
est is involved, the Red Lake Band's laws will be affected in the same
Roads maintained by the Red Lake Band traverse only 275 miles." - Minn. at __,
248 N.W.2d at 727.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Application of the two principles alone would make the Red Lake registration and
licensing ordinance valid only on the reservation, where the Red Lake Band is in control,
and would make it invalid off the reservation. As the court noted: "Persons required to
obtain motor vehicle licenses from the Red Lake Band pursuant to the ordinance can be
expected, almost without exception, to make regular use of Minnesota's highways." Id. If
only the two principles could be applied, therefore, regular use of nonreservation highways
would require Red Lake residents to obtain two licenses and titles.
39. See id. In the past, conflicts over whether the state or the reservation had jurisdic-
tion have arisen in fact situations where the act being controlled was tied to a particular
location. See, e.g., Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174 N.W.2d 120
(1970) (taxation); Sigana v. Bailey, 282 Minn. 367, 164 N.W.2d 886 (1969) (traffic acci-
dent); In re Beaulieu, 264 Minn. 406, 119 N.W.2d 25 (1963) (residency). In each of these
cases, the conduct involved was represented by a single instance and therefore a single
location rather than a continuing course of conduct that may involve a series of locations.
40. See __ Minn. at - , 248 N.W.2d at 727.
41. See id.
42. Compare Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d
836 (1946) (substantive rights acquired in Wisconsin under Wisconsin insurance law en-
forced in Minnesota) with Seamans v. Christian Bros. Mill Co., 66 Minn. 205, 68 N.W.
1065 (1896) (insurance corporation organized under Wisconsin law barred from recovery
in Minnesota because of failure to comply with Minnesota law).
19781
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manner as the laws of any of Minnesota's neighboring states, with the
result that Minnesota's laws will control. 3
Applying this third principle to the facts in Red Lake, the court deter-
mined that the state's denial of reciprocity would be detrimental to the
Red Lake Band's right of self-government." Thus, the determination of
whether the denial of reciprocity could be approved rested upon a show-
ing of a compelling state interest in such denial. Examining the record
before it, the court found no evidence that a compelling state interest
would be served by the state's refusal to enter into a reciprocity agree-
ment.'" In fact, the court determined that the state's interest actually
would be served by such a reciprocity agreement." Because Minnesota
Statutes section 168.187(1) specifically states that the policy of Minne-
sota is to promote and encourage the fullest possible use of the state's
highways through reciprocal recognition of vehicle registrations in other
jurisdictions, 7 the court found that section 168.187(1) required recogni-
tion of the validity of registrations and licenses issued by the reserva-
tion.48 Further, the court felt that the burden on Minnesota's highways
from use by Red Lake Reservation residents was no more than that from
use by residents of other states and that the advantages of a reciprocity
agreement between the state and the reservation were at least as great
as the advantages of such an agreement between Minnesota and another
state. 9
This new principle thus sets up a balance whereby the sovereignty of
both the state and the reservation are preserved to the greatest extent
possible. This does not imply that the first two principles are no longer
valid, for they remain the proper standards to apply when conduct is
related to a particular location. The new third principle is to be applied
when the conduct being regulated is not tied to a particular location.
In Red Lake, the Minnesota Supreme Court again recognized that the
Red Lake Reservation is indeed a community separate from the state
43. See, e.g., Seamans v. Christian Bros. Mill Co., 66 Minn. 205, 208, 68 N.W. 1065,
1066 (1896) ("[The laws and public policy of the state may be such as to completely
stamp out this comity .... ").
44. See - Minn. at __,___, 248 N.W.2d at 725, 727-28; note 38 supra and accom-
panying text.
45. See - Minn. at _, 248 N.W.2d at 728.
46. See id.
47. MINN. STAT. § 168.187(1) (1976) states:
It is the policy of this state to promote and encourage the fullest possible use of
its highway system by authorizing the making of agreements, arrangements,
and declarations with other jurisdictions, for reciprocal recognition of vehicle
registrations and/or for proportional registration, with respect to vehicles regis-
tered in this state and such other jurisdictions, thus contributing to the eco-
nomic and social development and growth of this state. It is the policy of this
state to agree with other states that no vehicle shall pay more than the equiva-
lent of one full registration fee per annum.
48. See - Minn. at - , 248 N.W.2d at 728-29.
49. See id. at __, 248 N.W.2d at 728.
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as a whole. This decision was mandated by the special status of the
reservation and by the court's recognition that where a people have been
given the right of self-government they must be allowed to exercise that
right to the fullest extent possible, provided they do not infringe upon
compelling state interests. The Red Lake decision indicates that the
Minnesota court will continue to limit severely the state's interference
with the self-government of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians.
Juvenile Law-REFERRAL FOR PROSECUTION-In re Welfare of I. Q. S.,
_ Minn. -_, 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976).
Minnesota, like most other states,' has a procedure for determining
whether a juvenile accused of a crime should be tried as an adult instead
of given special treatment because of age. These reference procedures
have been the subject of an "ever-increasing number of challenges."'
With In re Welfare of I. Q. S., 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court consoli-
dated and reviewed nine appeals from orders of state juvenile courts
either referring or refusing to refer nine juveniles for prosecution as
adults.
Reference for prosecution is the waiver of jurisdiction by a juvenile
court over an alleged criminal offense.' Reference means that the juve-
nile may be tried as an adult in a municipal or district court on the
referred offense. In making the reference decision the court balances the
welfare and interests of the juvenile against the state interest in protect-
ing members of society.5 Reference for prosecution normally occurs when
1. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.4 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.071 (Vernon 1962); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.533 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.18 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977).
2. In re Welfare of I.Q.S., - Minn. -, - , 244 N.W.2d 30, 34 (1976).
3. - Minn. -, 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976).
4. Under many state statutes the process of removing a juvenile or an alleged violation
by a juvenile from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to a municipal or district court so
that the juvenile may be prosecuted as an adult is termed "waiver of jurisdiction," see,
e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 11-1553 (West 1966); Thx. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 54.02
(Vernon 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978), or "transfer," see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501
(1976); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-34 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977). In Minnesota it is
termed "reference for prosecution." See MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1976). As of 1974 all states
except New York and Vermont had some procedural mechanism for waiver or transfer.
See Note, Sending the Accused Juvenile to Adult Criminal Court: A Due Process Analysis,
42 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 309, 309 n.3 (1975).
The procedure established by the Minnesota reference statute differs from that of most
other states. In Minnesota the case is referred to the prosecuting authority which then
decides whether to prosecute. If the prosecuting authority decides not to prosecute, the
juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the case and must proceed with it. See MINN. STAT.
§ 260.125(1) (1976), quoted in note 11 infra.
5. The balancing of interests required is described in the statement of the purpose of
the Minnesota Juvenile Act:
The purpose of the laws relating to juvenile courts is to secure for each minor
under the jurisdiction of the court the care and guidance, preferably in his own
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